This analysis uses survey data representing three of the world's most populous Muslim majority countries to challenge conventional wisdom on what shapes Muslim public opinion on political violence against the United States. It improves previous analysis by clearly distinguishing support for violence against civilians from support for violence against military targets and by featuring independent variables that clearly separate views on US foreign policies from views on US culture. Logistic regression shows that, among Egyptian, Pakistani and Indonesian Muslims, perceptions of controversial US policies toward Israel, Middle Eastern oil, or the perceived attempt to weaken and divide the Muslim world are not related to support for attacks on civilians in the United States, but only to support for attacks on US military targets. Approval of attacks on US civilians is shaped, instead, by negative views of US freedom of expression, culture, and people, disapproval of the domestic political status quo as well as the notion of general US hostility toward democracy in the Middle East. This last finding has important implications for US and Western policies toward the post-Arab Spring Middle East in particular and the broader relationship with the Muslim World in general.
Introduction
More than a decade after the events of September 11, 2001 , investigations of the sources of public support for Islamist terrorism are still limited in number and scope when compared with the substantial quantitative and qualitative studies of possible root causes of terrorist attacks (Berrebi, 2007; Urdal, 2006; Piazza, 2006; Li and Schaub, 2004; Testas, 2004; Krueger and Maleckova, 2003) . 1 This gap is unfortunate given the dependence of terrorist organizations on a minimum level of societal support in their efforts to recruit members and to facilitate operational assistance (Sarseloudi, 2005) . As Paul Pillar, National Intelligence
Officer for the Near East and South Asia from 2000 to 2005, pointed out, '(t)he target for intelligence is not just proven terrorists; it is anyone who might commit terrorism in the future (2004: 115, emphasis in original) .' Since these future terrorists are likely to be recruited from among those who sympathize with terrorist attacks in the first place, many academic and political observers view reduced public support for terrorism as a central measure of successful US counterterrorism efforts (Cronin, 2006; Simon & Martini, 2004; Byman, 2003) .
This examination of Muslim public opinion on terrorist attacks on US civilians and guerillatype attacks on US military targets is guided by the broader theoretical debate on the role which perceptions of US foreign policies and US culture might play. In particular, it utilizes Katzenstein & Keohane's (2006: 26) important contribution on the manifestations of AntiAmericanisms which differentiates 'unfavorable judgments about the United States or its policies' from the deeper resentment of US culture and its people. The firm belief that 'America's identity ensures that its actions will be hostile to the furtherance of good values, practices and institutions elsewhere in the world' (Katzenstein & Keohane, 2006: 31) sets the 'biases' of such culture-centered Anti-Americanism apart from the 'opinions' of policy-centered Anti-Americanism that shares key American values but deplores US failure to act on them either at home or abroad.
Employing independent variables that reflect these long over-due specifications, this article
shows that negative assessments of controversial US policies toward Israel, Middle Eastern oil or a general sense of US hostility toward the Muslim world only shape public support for political violence against US military targets, not against US civilians. Instead, approval of 9/11-type terrorist attacks on civilians in the United States is only driven by negative views of US culture as well as the rejection of the domestic political status quo and perceived US hostility to Muslim democracy.
This article proceeds as follows: The first section briefly reviews the main theoretical arguments regarding the possible correlates of public support for Islamist terrorism. The second section sets out the benefits and limitations of the present data set and the methodology employed for its analysis. The third section presents and discusses the results of binomial logistic regression analyses conducted for each country. The final section lays out the theoretical and policy implications of this paper's findings.
Theory and hypotheses
The post-9/11 debate about what might drive some Muslims to support terrorist attacks directed at the United States has primarily been shaped by arguments that point to the widespread rejection of US policies and those that emphasize Muslim resentment of what the United States represents. In an early assessment that focused on the root causes of terrorist engagement, but is also relevant for the debate on possible drivers of Muslim public opinion,
Stephen Walt saw a combination of both factors at work 'At one extreme, terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda are inspired by an intense antipathy toward the United States and its global dominance. Some of this antipathy arises from a particular vision of the United States as a corrupt and godless society, but it is also fueled by America's close relationship with Israel, its support for several conservative Arab regimes, and its seemingly endless conflict with Iraq (2001/02: 59) .'
In its qualification of cultural explanations, Walt's argument is in line with publications which link support for political violence with foreign occupation and perceived US political dominance (Pape, 2005 ; for a critique see Moghadam, 2006) or a general sense of humiliation and betrayal emanating from US policies towards the Arab-Israeli conflict and Iraq (Fattah & Fierke, 2009 ).
This paper seeks to examine the extent to which these possible causes of engagement with terrorism are also possibly shaping public support for terrorism. Previous quantitative explorations by Tessler & Robbins (2007) as well as Mostafa & al-Hamdi (2007) showed that negative views of US foreign policies correlated with greater support for political violence against the United States. The following analysis will thus test Hypothesis I: Among Muslim publics, support for political violence against US civilians is associated with negative views of US foreign policies toward the Middle East.
Others asked whether Arab governments had to accept at least some responsibility for the rise of anti-US violence. Moghaddam (2005) , for instance, hypothesized that the perceived injustice associated with a lack of options for peaceful participation in decision-making constituted the first rung on a five-step 'staircase toward terrorism'. Indeed, Fawaz Gerges Their leaders are self-appointed. They hate our freedoms -our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other (2001) .'
Such assessments find some support in the writings of Islamist radicals such as Sayyid Qutb, who inspired those who would later become involved in al-Qaeda (Shepherd, 2003; Brown, 2000; Moussalli, 1992; Goldberg, 1991; Kepel, 1985) . In one of the letters he wrote during his time as an exchange student at the University of the District of Columbia in Washington, DC and the University of Northern Colorado, Qutb (2000: 10) stated that:
'I fear that a balance may not exist between America's material greatness and the morality of its people. And I fear that the wheel of life will have turned and the book of time will have closed and America will have added nothing, or next to nothing, to the account of morals that distinguishes man from object, and indeed, mankind from animals.'
More recently, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama Bin Laden's successor as leader of Al-Qaeda, called for a 'holy war' against the United States in response to an Anti-Islam video, which, as he pointed out, was made possible by US freedom of expression (Guardian, 2012 (Halliday, 1993) was the hallmark of Samuel P Huntington's 'clash of civilizations ' (1996) and Bernard Lewis'
'The Roots of Muslim Rage ' (1990) . Numerous studies of public opinion data from several
Arab and Muslim countries failed to detect any direct relation between religious practice or identity and the support for violence, international conflict or groups such as the Taliban and al Qaeda (Fair, Malhotra & Shapiro, 2012; Mousseau, 2011; Shapiro & Fair, 2009; Tessler & Robbins, 2007) . On the other hand, Blaydes & Linzer (2012) found religiosity to be positively related to Anti-Americanism as measured in negative views of US culture. The final hypothesis thus is Hypothesis IV: Among Muslim publics, support for political violence against US civilians is associated with greater religiosity.
Data and methodology
In contrast to previous examinations of Muslim public opinion that have used an ambiguous dependent variable (Shafiq & Sinno, 2010; Tessler & Robbins, 2007) between men and women among the general population (Fair, Kaltenthaler & Miller, 2012) meant that the exclusion of such cases produced a sample with a substantially lower number of female (32%) and illiterate (32%) respondents than in the original sample (50% women; 43% illiterate). This is line with Krosnick & Milburn's (1990) finding that women (even if controlled for education) and the less-knowledgeable have higher non-response rates than men and those more knowledgeable. Concerns about the shortcomings of the Pakistani sample are mitigated by the fact that the main findings are, first, similar in the more balanced Egyptian and Indonesian samples and, second, confirmed in robustness checks which included those without clear attitudes on the political questions (tables A9, A10, A11, online appendix) or featured a dataset (tables A12, A13, online appendix) imputed with the Amelia II program (Honaker, King & Blackwell, 2011) .
A final caveat relates to the fact that public opinion surveys in authoritarian countries such as Egypt face the problem of possible preference falsification among respondents (Rowley & Smith, 2009; Kuran, 1997) . Many respondents might have felt uncomfortable with straightforward answers to questions about their support for attacks on US civilians or the US military. It can therefore not be ruled out that the dependent variables underreport support for anti-US violence. With regard to this article's particular interest in testing whether views on US foreign policies or US culture increase support for terrorist attacks on US civilians, the problem of preference falsification is mitigated by the fact that linking anti-Western violence with complaints about Western policies constitutes the 'safe' option in the context of regimes that had a strong interest in blaming external forces for (trans-)national problems with possible domestic roots (Behr & Berger, 2009) . It can therefore be assumed that with preference falsification working heavily in favor of detecting the influence of US foreign policy, the discovery of other robust predictors would be all the more significant.
With these caveats in mind, the data set analyzed here offers a number of important advantages over previous analyses that employed either exclusively urban (Shafiq & Sinno, 2010; Furia & Lucas, 2008; Bueno de Mesquita, 2007; Fair & Shepherd, 2006) or Arab samples (Haddad & Khashan, 2002; Mostafa & al-Hamdi, 2007; Tessler & Robbins, 2007) .
First, the START survey covered not only three Muslim countries that offer crucial variations in terms of, for instance, political system, political culture, socio-economic development and dominant interpretations of Islam. Egypt, Pakistan, and Indonesia were also all described in post-Cold War studies of US Grand Strategy as so-called 'pivotal states', which deserved particular attention because their "fate determines the survival and success of the surrounding region and ultimately the stability of the international system (Chase, Hill & Kennedy, 1996) ." In Egypt, the apparent defeat and delegitimization of domestic Islamist terrorism coincided with the unrelenting Islamization of the public sphere (Ismail, 2003; Gerges, 2000) . Since all these are widely blamed for having exacerbated Arab/Muslim concerns about US foreign policy, the present data constitute a solid base from which to explore possible links between support for terrorism and rejection of US foreign policies toward Israel and the wider region. The survey does not, obviously, reflect the Arab Spring which only began to reshape the Middle East two-and-half years later. At the same time, the Arab world's quest for democratic governance has in many ways only just begun. Associated questions about the shape of US support for political reform in this geo-strategically crucial region will thus be of political and academic salience for some time to come.
Dependent Variables
The third and most important advantage of the present data set pertains to the availability of adequately phrased questionnaire items that produce unambiguous dependent and independent variables. In their search for possible correlates of public opinion on terrorism and suicide attacks, Bueno de Mesquita (2007), Fair & Shepherd (2006) , Mousseau (2011) As the following analysis of less ambiguous dependent variables clearly shows, this question fails to specify whether the respondent is supposed to think of attacks on US troops in Afghanistan which would fall under the definition of guerrilla war, or whether to think of attacks on US civilians in the United States which would fall under most definitions of terrorism (Abrahms 2006; Wight, 2009; Hoffman, 2006 This present paper circumvents these problems by using the answer to a questionnaire item that eschews ambiguous cues (table II) :
'Thinking about the following kinds of attacks on Americans, please tell me if you approve of them, disapprove of them, or have mixed feelings about them? -Attacks on civilians in the United States.'
Insert Table II here The responses were re-coded into a binary variable where those who approved or strongly approved were coded as '1' and those who simply disapproved, disapproved strongly or had mixed feelings were coded as '0'. This reflects this paper's particular interest in what sets apart those who agree with political violence against the United States from the rest.
There are a number of theoretical and methodological reasons why separate analysis instead of a pooled analysis is warranted. First, focusing on only three countries, this analysis cannot aim at drawing conclusions representative of all Muslims. However, given clear differences in political, social, cultural, and religious contexts, any consistent pattern across three countries makes it more likely that they extend to Muslims in other contexts as well. Second, as the descriptive analysis shows, the three countries under consideration vary on a number of key variables of interest such as support for political violence and concern about US foreign policies and culture. Using one of the countries as the baseline for a regression analysis of pooled data would thus make the interpretation of the findings less clear. views on items that featured most prominently in the post-9/11 debates outlined above.
Survey participants were asked whether they believed it was 'definitely', 'probably', 'probably not' or 'definitely not' a goal of the United States to help Israel expand its geographic borders, control the region's oil resources, or weaken and divide the Islamic world In order to test the possible role of domestic politics in the Muslim world (hypothesis II), the following models also include variables measuring respondents' confidence in their national government, police, and judiciary ( 
Controls
Some of the views captured by this set of independent variables might reflect the socioeconomic costs of a development crisis which features prominently in many analyses of Islamist organizations (Ayubi, 1991; Sadowski, 2006) . Contrary to Crenshaw's depiction of urbanization as a major permissive cause for the modern phenomenon of terrorism (1981), Urdal (2006) did not find the urban-rural divide to be of statistical significance in explaining the outbreak of political violence. Yet, Mousseau (2011) found that Muslim urban poor were more likely to support suicide bombings in the name of defending Islam.
The image of an unmarried male in his twenties as the typical profile of someone looking for social recognition and belonging in a terrorist group has received some empirical substantiation with several studies linking younger age to higher support for terrorism (Bueno de Mesquita, 2007; Tessler & Robbins, 2007; Fair & Shepherd, 2006; Haddad & Khashan, 2002) . The empirical evidence on a possible link between age and negative views of the United States, however, is less clear with some studies showing a positive relationship (Blaydes & Linzer, 2012; Carlson & Nelson, 2008) and others showing a negative relationship (Harmaneh, 2005) . Similarly, Carlson & Nelson's (2008) finding that higher education was linked to more negative views of the US contrasts with the findings that greater wealth and higher educational achievement were all associated with less negative views of US culture and technology across 20 Muslim countries (Blades & Linzer, 2012 
Analysis
The results reported in table III show that, in striking contrast to hypothesis I and confirming hypothesis III, greater support for attacks on US civilians is not correlated with negative views on US foreign policies in any of the countries under investigation, but with negative views on US culture and its manifestations in all three of them.
Insert Table III here The impact of the perceptions of US culture becomes even more plastic through the calculation of predicted probabilities. For example, for an unmarried man, younger than 30 years of age, living in an urban area with incomplete school and below average income who prays five times a day, the probability of endorsing terrorist attacks on US civilians stands at 1.4% if he has very positive views on all dimensions of US culture in Egypt, 7.4% in Pakistan, and 1.5% in Indonesia. This probability increases to 9.3% in Egypt (from 4.3% to 24.6% if does not pray five times a day), to 23.4% in Pakistan, and to 16.2% in Indonesia if he has very negative views on all dimensions of US culture.
The total lack of influence of perceptions of US foreign policies in the civilian model contrasts sharply with the military model ( Insert Table IV on what might be seen as instruments of these policies, i.e. military targets. The fringe position of endorsing attacks on US civilians is more likely to be adopted by those whose negative views extend beyond US policies and into US culture and its symbols.
Quite remarkably, in pre-revolutionary Egypt, skeptical views of US democracy promotion correlated with greater support for both types of political violence. If a respondent held this view, the likelihood of him endorsing violence against US civilians increased from 3.6% to 12.2% in Egypt and from 5.2% to 9.9% in Indonesia, and against US military targets from 82.7% to 91.0% in Egypt. This pattern is somehow mirrored with the variable measuring confidence in national institutions which exhibits a statistical association with greater support for both forms of political violence against the United States in Indonesia. There, the probability of endorsing attacks against US civilians increases from 2.4% if the respondent has high confidence in Indonesian government, police and judiciary to 10.8% if he has not confidence whatsoever in these three institutions and against US military targets from 9.1% to 57.8%. In Egypt, this relationship is only noticeable with regard to the likelihood of supporting attacks on US civilians where those who viewed positively their domestic political institutions (1.8%) differed from those with negative views (7.4%). In Pakistan, a country that, at the time of the survey, was experiencing a US-supported transition away from military dictatorship under Pervez Musharraf, no such pattern was discernible (tables III and IV). The strong support for hypothesis II in the cases of Egypt and Indonesia offers confirmation of similar findings made by Tessler & Robins (2007: 32) (table IV) .
Conclusion
This analysis offered a more nuanced understanding of variables shaping Muslim public opinion on terrorist attacks on US civilians and guerilla attacks against US military targets.
Whether or not the insights into public opinion presented here can also be applied to the study of possible root causes of sub-state anti-US violence is, obviously, a question for separate analysis.
The stark differences in the relative influence of perceptions of US foreign policies and US culture between models that explain support for terrorist attacks on civilians and models explaining support for guerilla attacks on US troops corroborate previous calls to unmistakably distinguish between these two forms of political violence (Abrahms, 2006) . It has become clear that previous analyses purporting to provide evidence for a link between support for political violence against US civilians and perceptions of US foreign policies rested on misspecifications of dependent and independent variables, which blurred the lines between violence against US civilians and violence against US military targets and failed to appropriately control for the effects of anti-Americanism that rejects US culture. This highlights the need to pay closer attention to issues of concept equivalence and possible cues in the wording of future public opinion surveys on these topics. are so incorrigibly bad that they must be destroyed (Katzenstein & Keohane, 2006: 31) .'
It is important to point out that the findings on the role of US freedom of expression do not confirm Huntington's 'clash of civilizations' theory. This is because, as a related result, religious practice has a more ambiguous impact than Orientalist reductionism stipulates. The different strengths and directions the corresponding parameters exhibit across models and countries underscore the need to pay closer attention to the role of specific religious discourses. These multifaceted findings might disappoint those looking for a general pattern of religious influence. They do, however, correspond with other studies (Collins & Owen, 2012) which showed that among Muslims religiosity can indeed influence views on salient political issues, but that, contrary to essentialist viewpoints, this influence varies depending on the specific political context. The present results thus strengthen the arguments of constructivist scholars who have for a long time emphasized that religion's escalating or deescalating role depends on which reading of the holy texts is culturally dominant at any given time (Hasenclever & Rittberger, 2000) . Further in-depth quantitative and qualitative analysis is therefore required to explain which factors bolster the societal relevance of particular interpretations of religion.
Second, the rejection of US culture is not a prerogative of any single cultural context. Ceaser This investigation into variables associated with Muslim public support for anti-US violence reaffirms the urgency of this task.
Data replication
The dataset, codebook, and do-files for the empirical analysis in this article can be found at http://www.prio.no/jpr/datasets. Models have been produced using SPSS and Amelia II. 
